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THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF A DEPOSITOR

THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF A DEPOSITOR WITH
FUNDS FOR THE DISHONOR OF HIS CHECK.
When a bank receives the funds and checks of a depositor
and credits him with them in the usual way, there arises an
implied contract on the part of the bank to pay the depositor
the amount of his deposits upon demand and in lawful money:
I 11orse on Banks and Banking (3 Ed.) k§ 3 I1, 312 ; Bank of
Kcntucky v. [Eister, 2 Peters, 324 (1829). For refusal to pay,
an action of assmnpsit will lie by the depositor: .3farineBank
of Chicago v. Birney, 28 Ill. 90 (1862) ; First National Bank
of Lock Haven v. 11ason, 95 Pa. 1 13 (188o) ; Patterson v.
M31arine National Bank, 25 W. N. C. io8 (1886); M7[iller v.
Bank, 37 NV. N. C. 373 (1896).
But the law implies more than this single contract to pay
the depositor, on demand, the total amount of his deposits.
In the usual course of a depositor's business lie is, of course,
dailh drawing check after check against his deposits. And
the questions which it is proposed to discuss here are:
I. If a depositor has sufficient funds in bank and he draws
a check against the same, does not the law imply both a contract and a duty on the part of the bank to pay such check on
demand, and in lawful money; and if so, then
II. 'hat is the depositor's measure of damages for the
refusal of the bank to pay his check under such circumstances ? In other words, practically stated, what are the
rights of the depositor and the liabitity of the bank in such a
case ?
I. There can be no doubt, under all the authorities, that the
first query. must be answered in the affirmative. The rule is
well summarized in Citizens' National Bank v. I. & T. Bank,
I19 N. Y. 199 (189O), where the court says: "The contract
between two banks, as implied by law, was that the amount
of funds standing to the credit of the plaintiff bank on the
defendant's books should be held and paid out upon and
according to the plaintiff's checks or order; and a failure to
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pay an order for their payment was a breach of the plaintiff's
duty and contract, for which it is legally liable either in tort
or upon the contract."
In the case just cited, the form of action was ex contractu;
but in the leading case on the subject, .1rarasetti v. TT illiams,
I B. & Ad. 414 (1830), the declaration was in tort, for breach
of duty. The case was most elaborately argued by Brougham
and Theisger for the plaintiff and by Sir James Scarlett,
Attorney-General, Campbell, Justice and Williams for the
defendant, and separate opinions were delivered by Lord Tenterden, C. J., and his associates. The facts were that the
plaintiff drew his check for 87C. 7s. 6d. on the defendant.
Sufficient funds had been deposited to meet the check four
hours before presentation. "The clerk to whon" it was presented, after having referred to a book, said there were not
sufficient assets, but that the check might probably go through
the Clearing-House. The check was paid on the following
day. Under this evidence it was contended by the AttorneyGeneral that the plaintiff, having declared in tort, as for a
breach of duty, must be non-suited, inasmuch as he had not
proved any damage." The trial judge, however, directed the
jury to find for the plaintiff. Upon a motion for a new trial,
the court unanimously sustained the right of the plaintiff to
sue in tort.
Lord Tenterden, C. J., said:
"It is immaterial in such a case whether the action in
form be in tort or in assumpsit... My judgment.
proceeds on the ground that the action is founded on a
contract between the plaintiff and the bankers, that the latter,
whenever they should have money in their hands belonging
to the plaintiff, or within a reasonable time after they should
have received such money, would pay his check."
Parke, J., said:
- I am of the same opinion. This action being substantially
founded on a contract, I think it can make no difference
whether it is in tort or in assuzmpsit. There is no authority
for any such distinction."
Taunton, J., said:
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The plaintiff has a right to have his check paid at the
time it was presented, and the defendants are guilty of a wrong
by refusing to pay it. The form of the declaration, whether
it be in tort or assumpsit makes no substantial difference."
And Patterson, J., said:
-I think the verdict was right. The action is in form
founded in tort, but is in substance founded on a contract."
The right to sue in tort for a breach of duty was again
upheld in the case of Rolin v. Stewart, 14C. B. 595 (1854);
and the suit was also in tort in Birchall v. Thhd .1ational
Bank, I5 NV. N. C. 174 (884); Schqffzer v. Eknrman (Ill.),
28 N. E. Rep. 917 (i89I); and Rc.r v. NVational Bank of
Republic (not yet reported), C. P. No. 2 of Philadelphia County
(December, 189;). In Prchn v. Royal Bank of Li,epool, L.
R. 5 Exch. 97 (1870), however, the suit was c-r con/iac/u;
and such, too, as before observed, seems to have been the
form of complaint in Citizcns' Aational Bank v. I. & 7. Bazk,
119 N. Y. 199 (1890).
While the right to sue in tort, as for a breach of duty has
been declared in emphatic and unmistakable terms in Jai-azctti v. IlVi/liams, and some of the later cases just cited, yet
the reasons why a failure to pay is a breach of duty, warranting, therefore, such form of action, are but scantily given in
the opinions, the argument in most of the cases consisting
largely in the statement of the conclusion. Thus, for example,
in Jlara-.cuti v. Ifiltiams, it is simply stated as a conclusion
that ,the defendants " were guilty of a wrong in refusing to
pay" the plaintiff's check, and a similar statement, without
more, is made in Citi zens' A-ational Bank v. I. & T. Bank,
supra, though in Birhzallv. Thhd NXtional Bank, supra, Hare,
P. J., observes : - Inasmuch as the bank has the use of the
money, it undertakes a duty:" while, in Patterson v. Jfrine
iz!ional Bank, sup a, Paxson, C. J., delivering the opinion of
the court, declared that a bank is an institution of a quasipublic character, and that " there is something more than a
breach of contract in such cases. There is a question of
pubiic policyv involved." Further fragmentary reasons may,
perhap-s, be found in the cases. In the absence, however, of
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any complete judicial statement, the probable reasons why
such an action is sustainable may be summarized as follows:
The relation between a bank and its depositor is not simply
that of debtor and creditor. It is this and more. The bank
receives its depositor's notes and checks. It undertakes the
collection of the same, and uses the proceeds in its business:
in virtue of which undertaking and use, coupled further with
the quasi-public character of the bank, the law implies not
merely a contract but a duty to pay its depositor's check,
when presented. For breach of this duty to pay, of course,
the proper action is in tort. The last noted reason, viz.. that
the business of a bank is affected with a public interest is. it is
believed, the essential and fundamental i.2ason and thus brings
the cases within the ruling of the broad and well-recognized
principle that whenever a defendant's business is, by reason of
the services which he renders and the use to which his property is put, affected with a public interest, a breach of contract
made by such a defendant in the way of his business is, by
legal implication, also a breach of duty. Such is the familiar
status of a wharfinger, an innkeeper, a common carrier, and,
as showing the progress of the law, such more recently has
been declared to be the status of the owners of elevators and
warehouses where grain or other property is stored: inunn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); P'oplc v. Budd, 143 U. S. 528
(1891).
It is worthy of mention that in none of the above cited
cases in which the action was in tort was there any special
damage, or malice proved. As substantial damages (as we
shall see infra) may, notwithstanding, be recovered for the
dishonor of a depositor's check, the practical advantage of
suing in tort is obvious, i. e., in such an action the jury have
a greater latitude in assessing the damages than in actions e.x
contiaci, and the courts are, therefore, more reluctant about
interfering with their verdicts. In Prelin v. Roral Bank of
Livep ool, and Citiens' NationalBank v. . & T. Bank, supira,
in which the action was ex contralai, only such sums were
claimed and recovered as were arithmetically demonstrated to
be due.
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Of course, the bank must make payment of the depositor's
check in lawful money. This has been repeatedly held in the
Vestern States in cases in which deposits were made of bankbills of the so-called "wild-cat banks." Credit having been
given in the usual way for their nominal value in dollars and
cents, the courts have uniformly held that bills similar to
those received, or even the identical bills, could not be forced
upon the depositor, but that the bank's liability could only be
discharged in good money, such as under the law was then a
legal tender : I Jlo-sc on Bandks and Banking (3 Ed.) § 3 12;
Thompson v. Rigs, 5 Wall. 678 (1866) ; Jferine Bank of Chicago v. Clhandler, 27 I!. 525 (i862) ; ilfarine Bank of Chicago v. Rushmore, 28 Ill. 463 (1862); Willetta v. Paine, 43
Ill. 433 (1867). This view was also taken in Rex v. Xational
Bank of Republic, supra, where the bank, on account of the
financial stringency of the times, refused payment of plaintiff's check except in a Clearing-House due-bill, which the
holder of the check refused to accept.
II. \Ve come, then, to the second breach of the subject, viz.:
What is the depositor's measure of damages for the refusal of
the bank to pay his check when presented, provided the bank
then has sufficient of the depositor's funds with which to pay
the check ?
On this head, the decisions are apparently uniform, that for
the simple refusal of his check under such 'circumstances,
without proof of any special injury, or malice, the depositor
is entitled to recover substantial damages : Rolin v. Stewart;
Patterson v. Ma-ine i'ational Bank; Birchall v. Third
National Bank ; Schaefn- v. Ehirnzan ; supra. By substantial
damages is meant "not nominal, nor excessive, but reasonable
and temperate damages," such as the jury shall judge to be a
reasonable compensation for the injury the plaintiff has sustained from the dishonor of his check. Such was the direction of Lord Campbell to the jury at the trial in Rolin v.
Ste-wart, which direction was afterwards adopted by the Court
of Common Pleas, and declared by Cresswell, J., to be " perfectly right." In Pchn v. Roral Bank of Liverpool, supra,
Kelly, C. B., declared that the jury were .. entitled to consider
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all the probabilities and circumstances of the case, and to give
reasonable damages accordingly." The following excerpt from
the opinion of Martin, B., in the same case, at once clearly
defines general damages and distinguishes the same from the
several other kinds of damages:
"Now with respect to damages in general, they are of three
kinds-first, nominal damages, which occur in cases where
the judge is bound to tell the jury only to give such, as, for
instance, when the seller brings an action for non-acceptance
of goods, the price of which has risen since the contract was
made. The second is general damages and their nature is
clearly stated by Cresswell, J., in Rolin v. Stewart. They are
such as the jury may give when the judge cannot point out
any measure by which they are to be assessed except the
opinion of a reasonable man. Thirdly, special damages are
given in respect of any consequence reasonably or probably
arising from the breach complained of."
To the foregoing list, the learned judge might have added
punitive or exemplary damages, of which mention will be
made hereafter.
To the rule that on proof of the refusal to honor his check,
without more, the depositor is entitled to recover substantial or
general damages, there is among the decided cases one that
is apparently contradictory. This is the case of Mfaraetti
v. Villiams, supra, in which the Court of King's Bench held that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover only nominal damages.
But, in Rolin v. Stewart, supra, Cresswell, J., in sustaining the
above-quoted direction of Lord Campbell to the jury, that
they give " not nominal or excessive, but reasonable and temperate damages," declared further: " I think the case of
Marazctti v. Williams goes the full length of justifying that
direction. . . . The report of that case does not show what
the direction to the jury was on the subject of damages, but
it seems to have been taken for granted that the plaintiff had
sustained no actual damage." Thus explained, it is clear that
J-Ifaractti v. IfTlliams is not an exception to the current of
decisions on the question. Properly construed, it does not
limit the recovery to nominal damages, and no subsequent
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case, it is believed, contains any such limitation. On the
other hand, 2farazetli v. THllams does decide that special
damages need not be proved to entitle to recover, and the
subsequent cases follow the leading case in this respect.
We thus have a series of adjudged cases all ruling that
upon the plaintiff simply proving that the bank dishonored his
check he is entitled to recover substantial damages.
The reason for the ruling referred to is not, however, always
clearly stated in the opinions, and the reasons in some of the
cases are apparently conflicting. It may be instructive, therefore, to attempt to deduce from these decisions the true principle upon which it is founded.
Upon inspection, then, it will be seen that in M1wazarttz v.
TT illiams; Roln v. Stewart; Birchall v. Third NationalBank,
and Schaffner v. Ehrman, the reason given the holder of the
check for refusing payment was that the plaintiff did not have
sufficient funds to pay it. This statement was untrue, and
was due, in each case, to the mistake of the book-keeper.
Such an untrue statement was, of course, an imputation on
the plaintiff's solvency, represented him as in bad or failing
circumstances, and tended to injure him in his business.
From these decisions, standing alone, it might, therefore, be
inferred that to entitle the plaintiff to recover, he must prove
facts and circumstances which would amount to a slander by
the bank upon his credit as a merchant or trader.
But in certain others of the cases cited suapra, viz. : Prein
v. Royal Bank of Live,pool, Citizens' NationalBank v. I. & T.
Bank, Rex v. National Bank of Republic, and Patterson v.
h/arine National Bank, the reasons given the holder of the
check for refusing payment, as well as all the facts and circumstances of the case, flatly refuted the idea of any imputation upon the plaintiff's solvency, or any"slander of his credit.
Thus, in Prehn v. Royal Bank of Liv, ipool, supra, the defendant bank had accepted certain drafts of the plaintiffs, payable
at three months, and the plaintiffs had deposited sufficient
funds to meet the drafts. Before they came due, however,
the bank became insolvent. The plaintiffs thereupon deposited
sufficient funds with another banking-house to meet them, and
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when they subsequently came due and were presented to the
defendant bank for payment, the holders were informed of the
bank's insolvency and that the plaintiffs had arranged with
the other banking-house to pay the same. The drafts were
thereupon protested, according to mercantile usage, and the
second banking-house then accepted them supra protest and
paid them. Under this state of facts, counsel for the defendant
bank sought to distinguish the case from the class of cases
above mentioned, and argued that:
"The cases as to the refusal by a banker to honor his
customer's draft have no application. Such a refusal represents the customer as having committed a fraud in drawing
upon or accepting bills payable at a bank where he has no
assets ; or, at least, as having made a false statement as to a
fact within his own knowledge, and the injury to his credit
which this representation causes is the ground on which he
is held entitled to damages. But the cause of the refusal
here being the insolvency of the bank, no such consequence
can follow. It is, then, nothing but the ordinary case of
dishonor of a bill by the acceptor; and it is settled law that
in such a case, as in all cases where the demand is a mere
money demand, nothing can be recovered beyond the amount
of the bill and interest." (Page 96.)
The court, however, declined to adopt this view, Kelly, C. B.,
declaring:
" If the bills had simply been dishonored, and the plaintiffs
had brought their action, then, without proof of any such
special damage, the jury would, on the principle of Rolin v.
Stewart and Marazeitiv. Millians, have been entitled to consider all the probabilities and circumstances of the case, and
to give reasonable damages accordingly." A verdict for substantial damages was accordingly sustained.
Again, under the facts in Citizcns' NationalBank v. L1. & T.
Bank, supra, there was no slander of the plaintiff's credit. In
this case the plaintiff sold certain drafts on the defendant to
W. & Co., whose book-keeper forged certain endorsements
and the drafts were presented by his endorsee to defendant
and paid. Subsequently, the drafts were returned by the
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defendant to the plaintiff, and, being then demanded by W. &
Co., the plaintiff again delivered the same to W. & Co., who
thereupon presented the said drafts to the defendant. Upon
presentation, the defendant admitted it had sufficient funds of
the plaintiff on deposit to pay, but refused payment for the
reason that it had previously paid the same drafts. The
court, however, declared that the principle of IMaraetti v.
Williams " governs this case," and upheld a verdict in substantial damages.
Patterson v. ilarinc _.ational Bank, supra, also negatives
the view that actual slander of the plaintiff's business credit is
necessary to recover. In this-case the plaintiff drew his check
to his own order for the total amount of his deposits and presented it for payment himself. There being no third person
concerned in the transaction, there could, of course, be no
slander of the plaintiff's credit. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, nevertheless, ruled that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover substantial damages.
InI the light of these decisions, slander of the plaintiff's
credit is plainly not the true basis of the ruling, but is simply
one " of the circumstances of the case" which goes in aggravation of the damages. Instead, its real foundation is, it is
conceived, that given by Paxson, C. J., in Patterson v. M17arine
National Bank, as follows:
"A bank is an institution of a quasi-public character. It is
chartered by the government for the purpose, inter alia, of
holding and safely keeping the moneys of individuals and
corporations. It receives such moneys upon an implied contract to pay the depositor's check upon demand. Individual
and corporate business could hardly exist for a day without
banking facilities. At the same time, the business of the
community would be at the mercy of banks if they could at
their pleasure refuse to honor their depositor's checks and
then claim that such action was the mere breach of an ordinary
contract for which only nominal damages could be recovered,
unless special damages were proved. There is something
more than a breach of contract in such cases ; there is a question of public policy involved, as was said in Bank v.M1ason,
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95 Pa. 113, and a breach of the implied contract between the
bank and its depositor entitles the latter to recover substantial
damages."
Special damages may, however, also be recovered. They
are such a loss as must be specially proved on the trial by
evidence. Such damages, according to the definition of
Martin, B., before quoted, "are given in respect of any consequence reasonably or probably arising from the breach complained of "-e. g., if the plaintiff were to prove that his
customers, A., B. and C., who theretofore had dealt with him
in his business, had, in consequence of the dishonor of his
check, been led to suspect he was in bad financial condition,
and refused to deal further with him, such evidence would
entitle the plaintiff to recover special damages. See Larios v.
Gurety, L. R. 5 P. C. 346 (873), where both general and
special damages were claimed.
Punitive damages, or damages by way of punishment,
sometimes called exemplary damages, may also be recovered
if the evidence establishes that the bank acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights or with malice against him in
refusing to pay his check. See Patterson v. Marine National
Bank, supra.
In a proper case, therefore, special and punitive damages,
as well as general damages, may be recovered by a depositor
for the dishonor of his check.
John C. Bell.
Philadelphia.

